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Asbestos caused Lung Cancer: An issue ripe for review 
Alan Mckenna1 
 




Following the recent decision in the case of Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks 
Ltd that a claimant succeeds in an asbestos related lung cancer claim where 
they can show defendants materially increased the risk of lung cancer 
occurring, this article considers the current state of the law and availability of 
compensation through statutory schemes, and looks at the different approach 
taken by Australian courts in developing the law in this area. 
The latest available data from the HSE for mesothelioma deaths in the UK 
shows that in 2013 2,538 people succumbed to this invidious disease.2 It is 
important however to appreciate that the curse of asbestos extends beyond 
mesothelioma, being responsible for other fatal conditions; as a primary 
example of this it has been estimated that the ratio for every asbestos related 
lung cancer death to every mesothelioma death is between two thirds and 
one, which means that in 2013 there may have been up to 2,500 lung cancer 
deaths in this country related to asbestos exposure.3 Whilst asbestos related 
lung cancer deaths might be equal in number to mesothelioma deaths 
annually, only limited attention has arguably ever been paid to such deaths, 
and as such it may be said that there is a substantial moral, scientific, and legal 
deficit.  
The central reason for the paucity of attention has the obvious answer that 
where lung cancer is concerned the curse of smoking will always stand as the 
primary suspect, and as a consequence the impact of asbestos exposure is 
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either not a consideration at all or at best generally relegated to in most 
instances a secondary afterthought.  
The longstanding failure to appropriately address asbestos caused lung cancer 
has led to an invidious position whereby it may be argued that large numbers 
of those who have been negligently exposed to asbestos and subsequently 
contracted lung cancer have not received the compensation that they should 
be entitled to. 
In addition to the deep shadow that smoking has created over the potential 
identification of other possible causes of lung cancer, there lies a further 
compounding issue for lung cancer victims where asbestos exposure is a 
potential factor - the paltry levels of funding made available for research into 
asbestos and asbestos related diseases.4 Whilst it may understandably be 
argued that lung cancer as a disease has attracted meaningful levels of 
research funding, this cannot be said of the area of asbestos related diseases, 
which has been woefully underfunded, and in consequence of this in respect to 
asbestos caused lung cancer we have not reached the level of understanding 




The Legal Position 
Consideration of where the law currently stands on asbestos related lung 
cancer is usefully begun by first making reference to the position regarding the 
more legally developed area surrounding mesothelioma, especially the 
situation of where a claimant has been exposed to asbestos by more than one 
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employer. In multiple employer situations, mesothelioma claimants had faced 
an evidential impossibility as regards establishing that any employer was a 
cause of their mesothelioma. Simply put, from a scientific perspective it could 
not be established whether any employer ?s negligence in exposing their 
employee to asbestos was directly implicated in causing the mesothelioma. As 
a consequence of this, the House of Lords in the case of Fairchild v Glenhaven 
(2003), ruled that a claimant would meet the requisite causation by showing 
that an employer had materially increased the risk of them contracting 
mesothelioma.5 By what has become known as the Fairchild Exception, it 
would then be possible for a claimant to need only sue one former employer in 
order to receive full compensation for their mesothelioma. However, a 
subsequent ruling by the House of Lords in Barker v Corus (2006), held that a 
claimant would need to sue each negligent employer on the basis that they 
had materially increased the risk of them contracting mesothelioma, as it was 
considered unfair that one employer could be financially responsible for the 
whole amount of the damages, as for example there could be situations where 
it was not possible for them to obtain financial contributions from other 
negligent former employers who may have negligently exposed the claimant to 
far greater quantities of asbestos, or as in Barker a claimant may have exposed 
themselves whilst working on a self-employed basis.6 The decision in Barker 
was swiftly overturned following an amendment to the law made within the 
Compensation Act 2006, returning the law to the position decided in Fairchild, 
but only crucially in respect to mesothelioma, and not as regards any other 
indivisible disease where asbestos is implicated, such as lung cancer.7 
Unlike with mesothelioma, there exist only a few legal actions on asbestos 
related lung cancer cases that have been considered by UK courts. In the 2005 
case of Badger v Ministry of Defence, tŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐŚƵƐďĂŶĚŚĂĚǁŽƌŬĞĚĂƐĂ
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boiler maker for the Ministry of Defence for 33 years, and in that time he was 
negligently exposed to asbestos by the defendants who recognised they had 
been in breach of their statutory duty and this was causative of the lung cancer 
that killed Mr Badger.8 However, Mr Badger had also been a long term smoker, 
and it was contended by the defendant that the level of damages should as a 
consequence of this be reduced by a quarter as he had been contributorily 
negligent. The medical experts for both sides in their joint reports considered 
the lung cancer to be an indivisible disease and the death of Mr Badger had 
been due to both the tobacco and asbestos.9 In assessing the possible level of 
contributory negligence, Mr Justice Stanley Burnton, found that all of the 
deceased ?Ɛ lifetime smoking should not be taken into consideration, as Mr 
Badger ŚĂĚďĞŐƵŶƐŵŽŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐďƵƚŝƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚhowever until the early 
1970s that health warnings were placed on cigarette packets. The judge 
considered a prudent person in the position of the deceased would have given 
up smoking in the mid 1970s.10 After consideration of risk factor data of the 
deceased continuing to smoke, ultimately a 20% reduction in damages due to 
contributory negligence was decided upon. 
In a further asbestos related lung cancer case coming in 2008, Shortell v BICAL 
Construction Ltd, in contrast to the Badger case the question of causation was 
a contended matter, along with again the issue of contributory negligence due 
to heavy smoking coming under consideration.11 As in the Badger case, Mr 
Shortell was only exposed to asbestos by one employer. The parties agreed 
that causation would be established if it could be shown that there had been a 
doubling of the relative risk that Mr Shortell would contract lung cancer due to 
ƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨĚƵƚǇŝŶĞǆƉŽƐŝŶŐŚŝŵƚŽĂƐďĞƐƚŽƐ, however the 
precise level of exposure faced was contested. Engineering evidence from the 
ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌƚsuggested that Mr Shortell had been exposed to a level of 99 
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fibre/ ml years, which was above the Helsinki Criteria for Diagnosis and 
Attribution (1997) figure of 25 fibre/ ml years by which a causal connection in 
lung cancer is accepted to be made out, and clearly sufficient to meet the 
doubling of risk test. Mackey J accepted that a doubling of the relative risk had 
been made out, and on the issue of contributory negligence due to Mr 
^ŚŽƌƚĞůů ?ƐƐŵŽŬŝŶŐƉŽƐƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶŚĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌƐŽĨ
smoking, he considered that he was not bound solely in this regard by 
statistical analysis, but what in the case was just and equitable, assessing the 
contributory negligence at a level of 15%. 
The Badger and Shortell cases both featured a single employer exposing their 
employee to asbestos, and thus the problematic factor of multiple negligent 
employers did not arise. This problem however was a central factor in the 
recent case of Heneghan v Manchester Dry Dock (2014), although smoking was 
not a further complicating factor, so no requirement to address possible 
contributory negligence was needed.12 
In his judgment, Jay J, considered that legally mesothelioma and asbestos 
caused lung cancer were indistinguishable.13 Such a finding does not lead to 
the same legal outcome however, and the legal position for lung cancer victims 
who have been exposed to asbestos remains potentially far more challenging. 
The claimant it was decided must first establish that asbestos was a/the cause 
of their lung cancer, and this is to be achieved by reference to the doubling of 
the risk test. This was comfortably met by the combination of all the levels of 
exposure caused by the defendants and comparing this to the Helsinki Criteria 
figure by which it is considered that asbestos caused cancer can be triggered. 
Once a doubling of the risk is established, the claimant then needed to move to 
the who question, and this Jay J  considered can be found by meeting the 
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material increase in the risk causation test as utilised in mesothelioma actions. 
Unlike in mesothelioma actions however, because of the still applicable House 
of Lords ruling in Barker v Corus, a claimant needs to show that each party who 
exposed them negligently to asbestos did materially increase the risk of them 
contracting lung cancer. Failure to do so, or specifically as in Heneghan where 
only some of the potential defendants were being sued, will result in less than 
full compensation being obtained for the harm suffered. 
The outcome in Heneghan appeared to heavily rest on which eǆƉĞƌƚ ?ƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
was ultimately favoured by the court. The claimant had sought to argue 
ĐĂƵƐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐŚĂĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ
to the contracting of lung cancer, whilst the defendants argued that causation 
on that basis could not be shown, and only causation on the material increase 
in  the risk basis was applicable. As defendants representing only 35.2% of the 
ŽǀĞƌĂůůůĞǀĞůŽĨĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƚŽĂƐďĞƐƚŽƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐůŝĨĞǁĞƌĞ
being sued, it meant that if the defendants argument was accepted then only 
35.2% of damages for the lung cancer would be awarded, in contrast to 100% 
damages if the material contribution test causation were accepted as being 
applicable. 
The defendants expert witness, Dr Moore-Gillon, considered that it was 
impossible to say that asbestos fibres from each of the negligent defendants 
ĐĂƵƐĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐĂƌĐŝŶŽŐĞŶŝĐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐůƵŶŐ
cancer. For him, it could only be argued that fibres from each defendant had 
contributed to the risk of lung cancer.14 dŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌƚ ?ƌZƵĚĚ ?
considered that if establishing causation in such cases depended upon 
establishing the precise molecular and cellular events which led to a disease, 
then any particular cause of a cancer could never be established. In 
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consequence of this he argued that medical science adopts an approach based 
upon epidemiological observations, and where exposure is above de minimis 
levels, then it can be inferred that each exposure has made a material 
contribution to the disease. Dr Rudd was asked if the lung cancer might still 
have occurred if the defendant who had exposed the claimant the least, the 
level being 2.5% of the overall total, was removed. He responded affirmatively, 
and went on to say this would be the case if any of the negligent defendants 
were hypothetically removed.15 Whilst this may have been quite telling and 
persuasive for both the court of first instance, and the subsequent appeal 
heard in the Court of Appeal, the fact must remain that there was negligent 
exposure and hypothetical removal of a party cannot arguably be seen as 
negating that they may have materially contributed to the cancer, as clearly 
their asbestos fibres were inhaled into the body of Mr Heneghan. However, Jay 
J, considered that the possibility of a defendant party who had for example 
only been responsible for 2.5% of the overall exposure to asbestos being 
potentially liable for 100% of the damages would in his mind be unfair.16 He 
followed in this regard comments made by Mrs Justice Swift in the non- 
asbestos lung cancer case, Jones and others v Secretary of State for Climate 
Change (2012) (case is sometimes referred to as Phurnacite), who also felt it 
would be unfair to defendants who may only be responsible for a small part of 
the carcinogens in the overall levels of exposure to be liable for full damages.17 
Dr Rudd was also an expert witness for the claimants in the Phurnacite case, 
and there he was asked about his view that every exposure to a carcinogen 
materially contributed to the carcinogenic process, and as such why there 
would be a need for the Fairchild exception. His response was that since the 
time of the evidence given in the Fairchild case, the understanding of the 
molecular basis of carcinogens had measurably improved, and if he were asked 
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the same question now as he was in Fairchild, his response would be that it 
was probable that asbestos fibres from each source had contributed to the 
carcinogenic process.18  
In the appeal of Heneghan, the Court of Appeal accepted the reasoning of Jay 
J, with Lord Dyson considering that the judge had been correct to reject the 
opinion of Dr Rudd that every exposure had contributed to the development of 
the lung cancer. >ŽƌĚǇƐŽŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŶŽƚƚŽďĞĂŵĞĚŝĐĂů
opinion but rather,  ‘It was an opinion that an inference of causation could be 
ĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞƉŝĚĞŵŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?19 Furthermore, Lord Dyson believed 
that Jay J was correct in being able to find support for his conclusion from the 
Australian case of Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis (2010)20, in which a claimant had been 
exposed to asbestos by two employers, but who had also been a heavy 
smoker.21 Where there was no medical evidence that could provide the basis 
for the cause of the lung cancer, the High Court of Australia rejected the 
claimants argument that an inference could be drawn that the lung cancer was 
caused by both the negligent employers in exposing the claimant to asbestos, 
as the epidemiological evidence pointed to a far higher probability that 
smoking had been the cause of the cancer rather than asbestos. 
The support adduced in the Heneghan case by the finding in Amaca v Ellis 
takes us to a troubling aspect of the current state of the law in this country 
regarding indivisible asbestos conditions. As explained in regards to 
mesothelioma claims, there was an immediate parliamentary response to the 
decision in Barker v Corus to ensure that claimants would receive full 
compensation, but in regards to lung cancer linked to asbestos the law remains 
on the basis of the judgment in Barker. However, in contrast to the approach in 
this country, the Australian approach has been somewhat different. Australian 
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courts have chosen not to allow the material increase in risk causation test, 
requiring that causation be established either on the traditional but for basis or 
ƚŚĂƚĂĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐŶĞŐůŝŐĞŶƚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŵĂŬĞƐĂŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽthe 
harm suffered by the claimant. 
Unlike the position adopted in this country ?ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐĞŶŝŽƌĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƚŚĞ
High Court of Australia, have accepted that it is possible to bring a successful 
mesothelioma action where there are multiple negligent parties on a 
conventional causation basis. In the case of Booth v Amaca Pty Ltd (2010), the 
claimant a retired motor mechanic brought an action against two companies, 
Amaca and Amaba, who manufactured brake lining products which it was 
found had been responsible for 70% of his exposure to asbestos.22 At first 
instance in the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales, Curtis J, had found 
that the asbestos from the brake linings of both defendants had materially 
contributed to the clĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞƐŽƚŚĞůŝŽŵĂ ? The basis of this 
finding was acceptance of ƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?Ɛexpert, 
Professor Henderson, who ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ? ‘When there are multiple episodes of 
asbestos exposure, and the individual concerned inhales increasing number of 
fibres on different occasions, that contributes to the total burden of asbestos 
fibres deposited in the lung, and translocated to the pleura and [it] is thought 
that mesothelioma develops because of an inter-action between the asbestos 
ĨŝďƌĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞƐŽƚŚĞůŝĂůĐĞůůƐďǇǁĂǇŽĨƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇĐŚĞŵŝĐĂůŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ? ?23 
Professor Henderson whilst accepting that the science remained incomplete 
and some uncertainty remained regarding causative links at the cellular level, 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ‘It is, I think, almost universally accepted that all asbestos exposure, 
both recalled and unrecalled, will contribute causally towards the ultimate 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŵĞƐŽƚŚĞůŝŽŵĂ ? ?24 
10 
 
On appeal of Booth giving lead judgment in the Australian High Court, French 
CJ, considered,  ‘ĂĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŚĂƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨ
injury to the plaintiff must rest upon more than a mere statistical correlation 
between that kind of conduct and that kind of injury. It requires the existence of 
a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, albeit other causative 
factors may be in play. As demonstrated by medical evidence in this case and in 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌďǇWƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ,ĞŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂĐĂƵƐĂůĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶŵĂǇďĞ
inferred by somebody expert in the relevant field considering the nature and 
ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?25 French CJ concluded that,  ?/ƚŝƐĞŶŽƵŐŚĨŽƌ
present purposes to say that an inference of factual causation as against both 
Amaca and Amaba, was open on the evidence before the primary judge. The 
cumulative effect mechanism involving all asbestos exposure in causal 
contribution to the ultimate development of a mesothelioma had been 
propounded and was accepted by his Honour. It depended upon an 
understanding of physiological mechanisms. It did not depend upon 
epidemiology. ?26 
Given the way the law on mesothelioma has developed in the UK in regards to 
the question of causation, there is limited necessity as such to revisit this 
matter, but we do have to consider the question of causation as regards 
asbestos caused lung cancer. The decision in the Heneghan case points firmly 
to the position that all that currently is available to a lung cancer claimant in a 
multi-employer situation is to establish causation on a material increase in the 
risk basis, and potentially not receive full damages. However, useful reference 
can again be made to the legal position that has been developed by the 
Australian courts. In the case of Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim (2012), the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal had to consider a claim in which the estate of the 
deceased were suing in a multi-employer situation after the deceased had 
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contracted asbestosis and lung cancer.27 At first instance, the Dust Diseases 
Tribunal of New South Wales, accepted the claimant ?s expert evidence, 
including evidence provided by Professor Henderson, that all of the defendants 
ŚĂĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?ƐůƵŶŐĐĂŶĐĞƌďǇŶĞŐůŝŐĞŶƚůǇ
exposing him to asbestos.28 On appeal, the defendants sought to argue that 
use of material contribution could only be made by reference to the but for 
causation test. This was rejected by the New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
who found that the but for test is not the sole exclusive causation test 
available, and as such establishing causation on a material contribution basis 
had established causal liability of the defendants.29 
 
Statutory Compensation Schemes 
Not only does the currently established law in the UK provide significantly 
greater challenges for lung cancer asbestos exposed claimants in comparison 
to mesothelioma claimants, but the potential to obtain compensation via 
statutory schemes is also far more narrowly defined. Currently there exist 
three civil based compensation schemes by which it may be possible for those 
suffering from mesothelioma to obtain lump sum compensation. These being 
the 1979 Pneumoconiosis (Workers Compensation) Act Scheme, the 2008 
Diffuse Mesothelioma Scheme, and the 2014 Diffuse Mesothelioma Payment 
Scheme. Only the 1979 Scheme is open to those suffering asbestos caused lung 
cancer.  
A further lump sum compensation measure has recently been announced by 
the Government with the expansion of the Military Veterans Compensation 
Scheme following a successful campaign led by the British Royal Legion, 
enabling those ex-military personnel who were exposed to asbestos whilst 
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serving in the Armed Forces before 2005 and who have contracted 
mesothelioma to receive a lump sum compensation of £140,000.30 The new 
lump sum payment arguably reflects very roughly the average level of 
compensation that mesothelioma victims in general receive, so in essence on 
an overall average basis it can be seen as providing full compensation. Whilst a 
welcome move it does lead to the inevitable question about the position of ex-
military lung cancer victims? 
The Government recognise through the so-called Armed Forces Covenant that 
the nation must ensure that those who have served their country are treated 
fairly.31 But on the basis of the underpinnings of the Covenant can it be right 
that the revised Military Compensation Scheme is only restricted to 
mesothelioma victims?32 Have not those exposed to asbestos whilst serving in 
the Forces and who contract lung cancer an equal right to such compensation? 
The argument that there is no justification under the Armed Forces Covenant 
why lung cancer victims of asbestos exposure should alongside mesothelioma 
victims not be entitled to the new full enhanced lump sum compensation, 
would however if recognised by Government, lead to a legal dilemma 
regarding the current state of the law in respect to civilian lung cancer victims 
of asbestos exposure. 
The regulatory order amendment providing for the £140,000 compensatory 
award appears not to include any provision reducing the award where for 
example a claimant has also been exposed to asbestos outside of their military 
employment.33 This would therefore effectively mirror the outcome of the law 
found in the Compensation Act 2006 and thus a military claimant would be 
ĂďůĞƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ‘ĨƵůů ?ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵgh they 
may have also been exposed elsewhere. 
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However, if as I have argued that the Government should include other 
asbestos caused conditions within the scope of their revised Military 
Compensation Scheme and in effect pay full compensation, then the 
implications of such a move would lead to the inevitable conclusion that there 
could be no justifiable reason why as a matter of urgency an amendment 
should not be brought forward to the Compensation Act, by which indivisible 
conditions such as lung cancer where asbestos is involved, enable full 
compensation to be received where a material increase in the risk can be 
shown to have occurred when a claimant was exposed negligently. 
 
Conclusion 
The significant evidential burden imposed on those diagnosed with lung cancer 
related to asbestos has been reviewed, and despite Mr Justice Jay ?Ɛ opinion in 
the Heneghan case that legally mesothelioma and lung cancer are the same, 
the ultimate outcome for claimants in similar cases can be radically different.  
The disquieting fact that expert opinion on precisely what may be accepted as 
regards causal links between asbestos exposure and lung cancer has led to a 
significant divergence in approach between the UK and Australia, and points at 
least in part to the long term failure as regards research into asbestos related 
diseases.  
The positive news that military veterans exposed to asbestos pre 2005 and 
who have contracted mesothelioma will receive statutory compensation is 
tempered by a failure to include lung cancer within the compensation scheme, 
and this should be considered as discriminatory and unfair, and as such simply 
cannot be justified. However, by its inclusion this would then lead to a 
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situation whereby the general law would arguably be out of kilter with the 
effective impact of the compensatory scheme, and without modification of the 
law would present a discriminatory two tier compensatory structure in regards 
to asbestos induced lung cancer. 
In his recent JPIL article that analyses the Heneghan case, David Allan QC, 
argues that it is difficult to see a basis for distinguishing between 
mesothelioma and lung cancer victims, and that the extension of section 3 of 
the Compensation Act is for him compelling.34 If the government are 
persuaded to include within the revised Military Veterans Scheme lung cancer, 
there can be no justification whatsoever in not amending section 3. 
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